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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper lies in the solution of a specific problem area, 
referred to as modeling dilemma. In doing so, two major and, hopefully, 
innovative claims can be made: First, the social sciences can be characterized 
by at least two pragmatically highly differentiated modeling approaches to the 
socio-economic ensembles which, in different degrees, offer complementary 
classes of information and which, moreover, increase the understanding of the 
complexities of these socio-economic universes. Second, these two major 
modeling approaches have become, by now, part and parcel of separate 
epistemic cultures which will, in a process of co-evolution, form major basins o f 
attraction for future practices within the social sciences.
Zusammenfassung
ln diesem Artikel soll ein spezielles Problemgebiet gelöst werden, das als 
Modellierungs-Dilemma bezeichnet wird und das den prekären Status vieler 
Annahmen im Bereich der Modellbildung in der Ökonomie, der Soziologie oder 
auch der Politikwissenschaft zum Inhalt hat. Mit dem angebotenen 
Lösungsansatz sollen zudem gleich zwei neuartige Behauptungen verbunden 
sein. So können, so die erste Behauptung, die Sozialwissenschaften wenigstens 
durch zwei unterschiedliche und hochgradig ausdifferenzierte 
Modellierungsweisen charakterisiert werden, welche zudem komplementäre 
Informationen bereitstellen und jeweils auf ihre Weise einen Beitrag zum 
Verständnis komplexer sozio-ökonomischer Ensembles leisten. Zweitens gehören 
diese beiden unterschiedlichen Modellzugänge mittlerweile zu jeweils 
unterschiedlichen epistemischen Kulturen, welche hinkünftig ko-evolutiv 
wichtige Ziel- und Brennpunkte für die sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungen 
darstellen werden.

In the academic year 1939/1940, Joseph A. Schumpeter organized a non-dying Harvard Seminar1 on 
the topic o f rationality in the social sciences, including economics. After one year o f intense lectures 
from different scientific fields, Talcott Parsons was to edit a collection o f articles originating from this 
seminar. Schumpeter himself contributed a draft version where he introduced, by systematic ordering, 
a table o f four elementary problem areas relevant for the topic o f rationality. Accordingly, Schumpeter 
distinguished between two areas o f observation (observer/observed), and, moreover, between an 
internal and external perspective, where the internal or subjective point o f view referred to inner 
states, intentions or preferences o f individuals, be they on the observer or on the observed side, and the 
external or objective side could be qualified as ascriptive. Thus, Schumpeter arrived at the 
identification o f four main problem areas on rationality. However, Schumpeter did not succeed in 
providing satisficing accounts and solutions for each of the four rationality fields. Moreover, the 
planned publication underwent the process o f a dying Harvard or Non-Harvard collection volume. 2 
Consequently, the rest had  to be silence ...3
This small historical episode has been chosen as an introduction because o f two reasons. First, it offers 
a systematic summary of essential problem areas with respect to the utilization o f rationality- 
assumptions in the social sciences.4 And second, the episode makes abundantly clear that a highly 
problematic configuration, subsequently introduced and defined as modeling dilemma, has persisted 
for decades, not only within economics, but within the social sciences in general. Moreover, the
1 The phrase of the dying seminar in Harvard refers to the following narrative by Thomas C. Schelling (1978) -
Somebody organizes a group o f  twenty-five who are eager to meet regularly to pursue a subject o f  
common interest. It meets at some hour at which people expect to be free. The first meeting has a good 
turnout, three quarters or more, a few having some conflict. By the third or fourth meeting the attendance 
is not mich more than half and pretty soon only a handful attend. Eventually the enterprise lapses, by 
consent among the few at a meeting or by the organizers 'giving tip and arranging no more (SCHELLING 
1978:91f) -
where an unequal distribution of critical treshhold values for attendance leads to a continuous fading away of participants.
2 In a mode of analogy, the phrase of the dying collection volume, Harvard and otherwise, could relate to the following 
complex configuration -
Somebody organizes a group o f  twenty-five who are eager to write a paper on a subject o f  common 
interest. He sets a dead-line at which people are expected to have completed their contribution. The first 
dead-line has a good turnout, two thirds or more, a few having some conflict. By the third or fourth dead­
line the additional manuscript-tumout becomes negligible and pretty soon no one sends a manuscript any 
more. Moreover, a small number o f  authors withdraws their contributions. At this stage, the enterprise 
eventually lapses, since an interesting dynamic development is set in motion
where unequal distributions of critical treshhold values for deadly deadlines on the one hand and for necessary necessities 
to get articles published lead to all sorts of dynamic trajectories, including the fading away of manuscripts ...
3 For a brief summary of the Schumpeter seminar, see SWEDBERG 1994:175f.
4 In the following article, the term social science refers to all types of scientific disciplines which, in one way or the 
other, are concentrating on human actions, interactions and their respective results. Thus, economics as well as sociology, 
political science or psychology form core elements for a comprehensive set of social science disciplines. Moreover, the 
examples in this article are deliberatley chosen from a wide array of disciplinary fields, ranging from economic theory or 
econometrics to sociology and political science. Thus, any example from a disciplinary segement, which is supposed to 
exemplify a specific piece of information, should be taken as pars pro toto, since highly similar configurations could be 
identified within disciplinary areas,, too.
utilization o f rationality assumptions must be considered only as part o f a  wider methodological 
conundrum, since a large number o f heterogeneous simplifying components, ranging from statistics to 
the needs and peculiarities o f the algorithms used, enters into the actual model-building processes ...
At this stage, it seems highly appropriate, to introduce the central focus o f the present article, namely 
the concept o f the modeling dilemma, in closer detail. Put in a conventional methodological 
perspective by separating between empirical and normative domains o f discourse, the following 
dilemma arises, seemingly by necessity, within the social sciences and its model-building operations5, 
past and present:
On the one side o f the horn, any empirical interpretation of the normal model-applications 
in economics, sociology, political science or demography is confronted with the 
immediate objection that essential model-building operations violate even the most 
tolerant test-conditions. Consider the following excerpts from a fairly recent book on 
macroeconomics which reflects the current state o f the art of macro-economic modeling 
(FRJSCH/WORGOTTER 1993) and which, due to its very characteristic features, has 
been quoted extensively.
Consider a small open economy inhabited by a large number of identical individuals. The 
lifetime utility of the representative individual is given by ... (CALVO/VEGH, 10)
In order to account for the international trade in capital goods, we assume that both 
domestically-produced and imported goods can be converted into an investment good 
according to a constant retums-to-scale technology ... (GAVIN, 31)
There are three regions: Germany, France (which together make up Europe) and the 
United States ... here representing the rest of the world ... Exchange rate developments 
are perfectly anticipated apart from the effects of initial shocks (HALLETT et at., 49)
Domestic producers are assumed to maximise profit... by optimally choosing the variable 
inputs Lt and Nt ... We assume that domestic residents allocate their financial wealth 
between domestic money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds (HOF, 73f.)
Production is carried out by many identical competitive firms. For notadonal simplicity, 
the number of firms is equal to the size of the population (also equal to the size of the 
labor force) (HOON/PHELPS, 97)
5 The expression model-building is confined to those social science frameworks only that are characterized by a 
comparatively high degree of formalization and, moreover, are utilized within an explanatory context (See, e.g. FARARO 
1989, TROITZSCH 1990). Thus, the set of models under consideration ranges from classical macro- or microeconomic 
equilibrium models (WEINTRAUB 1977), to the growing stock rational choice-versions both in political science or in 
sociology (ELSTER 1983, 1986), or to the rapidly expanding class o f complex models across the social sciences 
(ANDERSON/ARROW/PINES 1988, CASDAGLI/EUBANK 1992, CASH 1992, 1994, HAAG/MUELLER/TROITZSCH 
1992, JEN 1990, MÜLLER/HAAG 1994, STEIN 1989, WEIDLICH/HAAG 1983)...
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We will assume a small open economy, and hypothesise a state of perfect capital 
mobility, that is, perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign interest-bearing 
assets (CLAASSEN, 137)
Investment depends on a number of non-quantifiable factors such as political stability 
and the industrial relations climate. Assuming these are favourable, we may write 
investment as a function of expected prices and their variance ... (WORRELL, 161)
The model contains a rudimentary construction sector supplying a durable good 
producing housing services ... For simplicity, no rental market for housing is included, 
that is to say, all dwellings are owner-occupied (NIELSEN/SORENSEN, 205)
We assume that there are two classes of speculators. One class is called 'chartists' (noise 
traders), the other 'fundamentalists'... The 'chartists' use the past of the exchange rates to 
detect patterns which they extrapolate into the future. The 'fundamentalists' compute the 
equilibrium value of the exchange rate (De GRAUWE/De WACHTER, 355)
Agents are assumed to have a qualitative (intuitive) understanding of the models. This is 
formalised by assuming that they use their own estimates (guesses) of the parameters in 
place of the true values. The assumption is that these parameter estimates have the same 
algebraic signs as those of at least one of the RE reduced forms. 
(GOLDBERG/FRYDMAN, 384)
It is supposed that there are two players on the market, and 'market expectations' are 
determined as a weighted sum of rational expectations and chartist expectations. 
(VIJAYRAGHAVAN, 401)
Thus, it seems quite obvious that any interpretation for these stage setting modeling 
assumptions as empirically we//-founded or valid runs into the serious risk o f having to 
accept any account, be it astrology, be it in the creationist spirit or be it, more generally 
speaking, o f the type characterized by Martin Gardner as bogus science (GARDNER 
1981), as genuinely empirical.
Turning now to the other side o f the dilemma by charcterizing the prevalent modes of 
operation as normative, one is immediately confronted with a different and similarly 
devastating inconsistency. Why? Take, for example, the three region assumption in the 
article by Hallett et al. Here, one cannot find any normative commitment that the world 
should  consist o f  three major nation-states only. In a similar manner, the Nielsen and 
Sorensen-paper does not state that it would be rational to exclude a rental market for 
housing. Consequently, any normative interpretation imposes an unjustifiable and, in 
most instances, highly implausible account of the role and function o f essential model- 
building assumptions. Moreover, any normative assessment clearly violates the actual 
practices with respect to the output o f economic, political or sociological model-building
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which, once again, is not phrased in terms of goals, reachability and choices o f 
appropriate means but which, in most instances, is couched in a conventional explanatory 
fram ework  by focussing on specific interaction patterns or on a set o f specially interlinked 
causes.
Consequently, Schumpeter's fourfold rationality domains turn out to be a comparatively small sub-set 
o f a wider class o f modeling components, rational or otherwise6, whose crucial deficiency and 
difficulty lies in their unresolved status, placing them apparently in the nowhereland between empirical 
and normative social science applications.
1. Escape-Strategies
Even in the year 1995, the puzzling  aspects with respect to the utilization o f rationality assumptions 
and other simplifying devices in the course of social science model-building have not vanished. On the 
contrary! A small non-representative sample from a recent survey on the significance o f testing in 
econometrics from the Journal o f  Econometrics (KREUZENKAMP/MAGNUS 1995a) reveals highly 
unfulfilled preferences -
Many outsiders are doubtful of the value added of econometric testing ... But also many 
econometricians are increasingly worried about the credibility gap between econometric theory 
and applied economics (KREUZENKAMP/MAGNUS 1995b:5)
There is a fragmentation of traditions, with some groups prosecuting empirical practices semi­
decoupled from most formal economic theory, others hewing to some loose Marshallian or Nash 
game-theoretic (as opposed to Walrasian) dictates, some standard statistical practices mutating 
into theoretical traditions (as with rational expectations), other decoupled theoretical traditions 
mutating into statistical projects ..., and finally, numerous statistical practices lacking any solid 
foundation in probablility theoiy at all. That all can, if they so choose, claim to be part and 
parcel of the orthodoxy is due to some loose shared beleifs, such as privileging constrained 
individual optimization or perhaps treating the standard restrictions upon utility functions as 
inviolate. (MIROWSKI 1995:32)
It is usually assumed that economists test to strengthen conviction. How this is achieved is 
mostly left undisclosed. In the conventional view, there is a clear line of logical implication
6 It must be emphasized, once again, that so many of the modeling parts which have been quoted in the introductory 
chapter like the equalisation of the number of firms with the size of the population (HOON/PHELPS 1993:97) cannot be 
attributed to the field of rational behavior and the domains of homo economicus.
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from theory to model; but as we shall see, in the process there is a narrowing and specialization 
of the hypothesis so that it is not clear what weight should be placed upon the result o f a test on 
the model. (KIM/MARCHI/MORGAN 1995:81f.)
Given the unresolved status o f core notions like testing and empiricity within an entire discipline and, 
more generally, within the social sciences as a whole, it should come as no surprise that a 
comprehensive set o f escape strategies has been furnished so far which follow one o f the twelve 
directions7 presented below in a simple alphabetical ordering:
ABANDONMENT: According to the first line of argumentation, any model-exploration 
into the socio-economic environments has the unavoidable consequence o f becoming a 
necessary failure. In the words o f David F. Hendry's Golden Rule Nr. 4 -
Stick to being a theorist (HENDRY 1987:30)
any attempts to link the socio-economic universes and data therefrom with socio­
economic models will suffer from incurable inadequacies, namely unbridgable distances 
between model-worlds and the intricacies of human life-worlds. While this type of 
argument is hardly found in contemporary social science methodology any more, it must 
be noted that in the evolution o f economics as a science, especially during the years o f the 
well known Methodenstreit in Germany, the abandonment-strategy has played a vital and 
very controversial role. Likewise, the famous Positivismusstreit during the 1960's has, 
from the viewpoint of critical theorists, brought forward interesting variations on the 
thema o f  model-abandonment for the social sciences in general. (ADORNO et al. 1972) 
APPROXIMATIONS: The second group of arguments stresses the fact that any 
modeling effort has to use approximations. Thus, the modeling assumptions utilized 
within the social science realm, economic or otherwise, are not confined to the humanities 
alone, but can be found within the whole scientific arena. For example, physics has 
introduced concepts like ideal gas, ideal temperature, etc. which must be qualified as 
approximations, too. (HEMPEL 1966) Not only that, also typologies in the social 
sciences like Max Weber's heuristic devices for ideal types which remain well below the 
level o f proto-modeling have to rely on distances and approximations. Thus, upon very 
close inspection, modeling frameworks like Rational Choice differ not substantially from 
life-world accounts like those elaborated by Alfred Schütz. (ESSER 1990, 1991)
7 A systematic treatment of escape strategies will, in all probability, reveal additional approaches to the modeling 
dilemma so that the number reached here, namely twelve, should be considered as a biblically inspired limit number and 
not as the result o f a comprehensive and ¿(//-encompassing taxonomy.
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CONFIDENCE-INTERVALS: The third line o f attempted escapes from the modeling 
dilemma has been prominently advocated by Edward E. Learner and can be summarized 
in a single device -
Experience has taught us that many inferences are quite fragile. And since we have no 
formal tools for separating fragile from sturdy inferences, we tend to act as if no 
inferences are sturdy. This unfortunate state of affairs would be much improved if we 
used a statistical theory that explicitly allows some inferences to be fragile and others to 
be sturdy. Inferences based on intervals of probabilities have this property. In some cases, 
after viewing the data, the intervals of probabilities will be short enough to be useful, but 
in other cases incredibly narrow initial probabilities will be required to produce usefully 
narrow posterior probabilities. (LEAMER 1987:3)
Thus, the introduction o f probability intervals and, moreover, o f probability distributions 
within such an interval may be seen, according to Edward E. Learner, as the necessary 
pre-requirement which lies at the basis o f subsequent models and the statistical inferences 
derived from them.
DUALISM: Despite David E. Hendry's proclamation o f the Fourth Golden Rule quoted 
above, he himself offers an interesting advice to those who still wish to undertake 
empirical research in economics.(HENDRY 1987:30) First, Hendry separates the realm 
of models into two types, namely into theory models which are -
free creations of the human mind, deriving implications from asserted theory 
relationships involving context-dependent latent constructs (IBID:30)
and empirical models which are -
anything but free creations. Their form is usually dependent on a corresponding theory 
model, but their properties derive from the process that actually generated the data, that 
is, observations on the economic mechanism of the relevant time and place filtered via a 
measurement system whereby certain data constructs are definded and quantified. 
(IBID:31)
From this basic distinction, Hendry arrives at a comprehensive set of evaluation criteria 
for both the empirical and the theoretical model set which, under the heading o f 
congruency, includes criteria like exogeneity or invariance for the empirical models and 
consistency and identifiability for the theory models. Finally, Hendry is able to close his
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dualist strategy by operationalizing a criterion o f encompassing both for rival models as 
well as for consecutive stages of a specific model family through which progressive 
research programs (Imre Lakatos) can be identified.
EXTERNALIZATION: According to the fifth  view, model-building, especially the 
utilization o f rationality assumptions, should not be considered, contrary to the history of 
decision and action theory, as a variation of intentional explanations, assuming, on the 
one hand, the causal efficacy o f reasons and, on the other hand, the rationality as well as 
the internal consistency o f beliefs and preferences of agents. Instead, an externalization 
move which is in acoordance with experimental settings for the psychology o f human 
decision procedures (SIMON 1955, 1956) postulates that one has to distinguish clearly 
between an internalist from an externalist explanation:
Describing the conventional requirement of intentional causal agency as an internalist 
interpretation, they (i.e. externalists, K.H.M.) contend that it is unnecessarily demanding 
for many of the questions social scientists study ... Accordingly, they propose that the 
theory should be thought of as illuminating ‘structures of social interaction in markets, 
governments, and other institutions ...As such they do not necessarily depend on 
psychological foundations. (GREEN/SHAPIRO 1994:21f.)
On this account, rationality assumptions as well as other behavioral or environmental 
specifications should be interpreted, at worst, in a counterfactual, externalist manner .... 
INFANCY: The sixth strategy lays heavy emphasis on the preliminary nature o f the 
model-assumptions which are characterized as a first, albeit a  necessary approximation o f 
comparatively young disciplines (see e.g. SPENGLER 1961) which, in due course, 
should be replaced at some later stage by their appropriate and empirically well-founded 
counterparts. Consequently, equilibrium models have been or will be supplemented by 
their non-equilibrium counterparts, static models by dynamic ones (e.g. 
GOODWIN/PUNZO 1987), linear preference models by nonlinear preference and utility 
theory (see e.g. FISHBURN 1988), the set of models with three regions will be 
generalized to the case of n areas, perfect capital mobility will be replaced by an 
imperfect version ... In a generalized perspective of the very long run, the existing model 
stock will become, by and large, dead and will be substituted by a comprehensive new 
model-repertoire which, finally, will be able to account for the actual complexities of 
socio-economic life.
INSTRUMENTALISM: In the seventh version, made originally famous by Milton 
Friedman, the importance o f model-building assumptions is effectively reduced to zero,
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since the only viable assessment criterion is seen in the successful predictive performance 
o f the model as a whole.
The relevant question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is not whether they are 
descriptively ‘realistic’, for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good 
approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by 
seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate 
predictions. (FRIEDMAN 1962:15)
Thus, in Friedman's paradigmatic D on't mind-strategy, model assumptions, contrary to 
his dictum on money, do not matter ....
MODEL-SELECTION: An eigth move away from the dreary consequences o f the 
modeling dilemma lies in the abandonment of problems of model testing altogether and in 
the shift to questions o f model selection only, a move moreover, which has been prompted 
by the -
difficulties with testing economic theories, particularly that the theories may be vague, 
may relate to a decision interval different from the observation periode, and may need a 
metric to convert a complicated testing situation to an easier one. We argue that it is 
better to use model selection procedures rather than formal hypothesis testing when 
deciding on model specification. (GRANGER/KING/WHITE 1995:173)
NONEXPERJMENTAL MODELING-TECHNIQUES: Already the ninth attempted 
path away from the modeling dilemma consists in a re-direction o f basic modeling 
designs, away from a methodological spectrum suited for experimental data, and directed 
towards designs especially appropriate for non-experimental data.
Although a multitude of reasons has led to this unsatisfactory state of affairs, ... the 
single most important contributing factor is the nonexperimental nature of the 
overwhelming majority of economic data whose modeling is undertaken using statistical 
procedures better suited for ‘experimental-like’ data. (SPANOS 1995:190)
Thus, for the social sciences, too, an adoption o f biometric methods is advocated where 
concepts like chance and randomness play, contrary to the conventional theory o f errors, 
a crucial and decisive role.
In the biometric tradition, ‘chance’ is inherent in human behavior because of its 
complexity and the data are viewed as realizations of random variables. In this tradition, 
‘randomness’ enters the modeling via the joint distribution of the observable random 
variables involved and not that of the errors. Using such joint distributions, the concepts 
of correlation and regression were introduced. (IBID:207)
SEGMENTATION: Following GREEN/SHAPIRO (1994:27), the segmentation strategy 
restricts model accounts like Rational Choice to a set of paradigmatic applications only.
In this manner, the predominant research task, before utilizing modeling approaches in 
the social sciences, becomes the assessment o f the adequacy or o f the appropriateness of 
the proposed research field with respect to modeling operations. According to the 
segmentation view, thus, only those domains should be selected for modeling which fall 
into the set o f admissable modeling segments.
STRUCTURALISM: An eleventh line of reasoning stresses the ill-founded character of 
the notion of empirical testability by furnishing a set-theoretic apparatus in which a  clear 
differentiation must be made with respect to the theoretic core o f a model, economic or 
otherwise, and the realm o f its intended applications (BALZER et al. 1984, BALZER et 
al. 1987, SNEED 1979, STEGMULLER 1980, STEGMULLER et al. 1982). From a 
structuralist perspective, then, the problem of empirical testability depends crucially on 
the demarcations drawn within the structuralist reconstructions.
WEAKENING: Finally, according to a last group of escape strategies, a split has to be 
introduced between thick (broad) and, not surprisingly, thin types o f frameworks. 
(ELSTER 1985, FERE JOHN 1991, 1993) Taking, once again, Rational Choice models 
of human action as reference case, thick (broad) accounts are assumed to asssume too 
much by positing specific preferences and beliefs on part o f human actors, whereas a thin 
rationality program presupposes only the far weaker requirement that subjects efficiently 
employ the means available to pursue their ends. In its thinnest form, only consistency 
requirements with respect to weak preference ordering are needed in order to be able to 
interpret social actions as rational.
It would be too tedious, especially at this point, to highlight the major shortcomings and deficiencies of 
the twelve escape routes from the modeling dilemma. Suffice to say that despite the apparent ingenuity 
o f the arguments it seems nearly impossible to overcome this dilemma: Any empirical justification 
strategy which is in accordance with the actual practices of the model-building processes in the social 
sciences, o f data collections, of model-testing procedures and of model -results, cannot offer a 
satisficing account of the empirical status o f essential model-building assumptions. E  converso, any 
normative interpretative framework is not only forced to neglect the empirical character of the model-
9
building practices, but also the wo«-normative utilization contexts. Moreover, the modeling dilemma is 
not simply confined to the dismal science o f economics, but reappears in political science, in sociology 
or psychology as well. It, the modeling dilemma has assumed, by now, pervasive proportions ...
2. Preliminary Considerations
In order to transform Schumpeter's draft version and, moreover, the twelve escape-strategies 
elaborated so far into a satisficing escape from the modeling dilemma, a requirement o f historical 
reachability will be introduced. The subsequent dissolution-sketch o f the modeling dilemma will utilize 
only those cognitive elements that have been available in Schumpeter's days, too. In other words, the 
dissolution will be accomplished via a reconfiguration and rearrangements o f cognitive components 
well known and ready at hand fifty years ago.8
The starting point for the successful dissolution o f the modeling-dilemma in the social sciences lies, 
first, in the utilization o f a very well-known and, by now, classical distinction, originally made famous 
by Rudolf Carnap already in the 1940's, namely the differentiation between pure  forms o f semantic 
analyses and their descriptive counterparts.9 By analogy, a similar differentiation will be introduced 
here with respect to pragmatics by differentiating between two main roads o f analysis, namely 
between pure  pragmatics on the one hand and descriptive pragmatics on the other hand.10 Thus, the
8 In certain contexts within the history of science, especially in the case of dilemmata, it becomes worthwhile to stress 
the point that, by an adequate process of permutations and reconfigurations, or, to borrow a phrase from Douglas R. 
Hofstadter, by a suitable variation on a thema (HOFSTADTER 1985), a successful problem-solution would have been 
ready at hand already a long time ago.
9 With respect to semantics, this separation took, according to Rudolf Carnap, the following form:
By descriptive semantics we mean the description and analysis o f  the semantical features either o f  some 
particular given language, e.g. French, or o f  all historically given languages in general.. On the other 
hand, we may set up a system o f semantical rules, whether in close connection with a historically given 
language or freely invented; we call this a semantical system. The construction and analysis o f  semantical 
systems is called pure semantics ... Pure semantics consists o f  definitions ... and their consequences; 
therefore, in contradistinction to descriptive semantics, it is entirely analytic and without factual content. 
(CARNAP 1975:1 If.)
10 Tims, the two main roads for pragmatic analyses can be formulated in the following variational manner:
By descriptive pragmatics we mean the description and analysis o f the pragmatic features either o f  some 
particular given scientific language games, e.g. during the period o f  the French Enlightment, or o f  all 
historically given scientific language games in general.. Thus, descriptive pragmatics describes facts; it 
is an empirical science. On the other hand, we may set up a system o f pragmatic rules, whether in close 
connection with a historically given scientific language games or freely invented; we call this a pragmatic 
system. The construction and analysis o f  pragmatic systems is called pure pragmatics ... Pure pragmatics 
consists o f  rule constructions ... and their consequences; therefore, in contradistinction to descriptive 
pragmatics, it is entirely analytic and without factual content.
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main ingredients for a pragmatic analysis o f science lie in the area o f scientific language games and 
rule-systems which characterize the essential moves, operations or practices o f such language games.11 
One o f the most interesting and heuristically fruitful tools for both types o f pragmatic analyses of 
scientific language games consists, as has been indicated already by another member o f the Vienna 
Circle, namely by Otto Neurath, in a morphological analysis12 (Neurath 1981). Neurath has 
elaborated on the morphological method in various articles around the time Schumpeter had finished 
his Vergangenheit und Zukunft der Sozialwissenschaften (1915). Proceeding along the analytical 
branch o f morphological analyses in the field of pragmatics, i.e. scientific rule systems, one could, in 
principle, define a large number of different cross-tables. Take, for example, the classical dimension, 
dating back to David Hume, between the empirical and the normative realms (HUME 1989, 
STREMINGER 1994), take, as a special instance, the subsequent differentiation between two areas of 
decision theory as a reference point -
Normative decision theory ... is deductive. It postulates certain criteria o f optimality or 
rationality or equity and derives strategies or methods of allocation or methods of aggregating 
preferences that are supposed to satisfy these criteria. A descriptive theory starts with 
observations o f how actors choose in given classes of decision situations and attempts to 
describe their behaviour as systematically as possible. (RAPOPORT 1989:5f.) -
and take, finally, a distinction put forward by Mario Bunge (BUNGE 1977, 1979, 1983a, 1983b) who 
differentiated strictly between two basic types o f systems approaches, namely concrete and conceptual 
ones -
A system, then, is a complex object, the components of which are interrelated rather than loose.
If the components are conceptual, so is the system; if  they are concrete or material, then they 
constitute a concrete or material system. A theory is a conceptual system, a school a concrete 
system of the social kind. These are the only kingdoms we recognize: conceptual and concrete. 
(BUNGE 1979:4)
Such a two-fold separation can lead to an interesting cross-table in which important groups of 
scientific practices or language games can be distributed across the resulting four areas.
11 Since the general focus lies in a pragmatic analysis, it will become clear, in due course, that the classical controversies 
of the Camap-Quine debate (QUINE 1961, CREATH 1990) simply cannot arise. Why? Because the pure or analytical 
dimension will receive, due to the pragmatic perspective, a thoroughly Quinean interpretation and justification ...
52 For a morphological analysis, be it along the empirical or along the analytical path, the necessary research steps can 
be summarized in the following manner: First, a small number of different and heterogeneous dimensions must be 
identified and arranged as cross-tables, offering a m x n array o f distinct combinations. Second, these cross-tables can 
then be used in different ways, ranging from the empirically observable and measurable distribution of these different 
combinations up to the detection of white spots which have not been realized so far... (See also DUBACH 1977)
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Table 1: A Morphological Space for Language Gaines in the Social Sciences
Dimension2 
empirical normative
concrete Area I Area II
Dimension j
conceptual Area III Area IV
More concretely, these four areas imply a division o f research practices within the social sciences 
according to which large parts o f evaluation research, planning or optimizations occupy Area II, in 
which most components o f linguistics and language-based research are situated in Area III, in which 
formal areas like mathematics or statistics lie within Area IV - and in which the main propoprtion of 
the scientific output resides within the first area.13
With respect to the modeling dilemma itself, the four problem areas o f the Schumpeter sketch on 
rationality can be generalized and arranged in the following manner:
Table 2: A Morphological Space for the Modeling Dilemma
Dimension2 
observer observed
internal Dilemma I Dilemma II
Dimension)
external Dilemma III Dilemma IV
The problems o f treating rationality assumptions and similar simplification components within the 
model building-operations in the social sciences can thus be separated into four areas. The modeling 
dilemma itself, while situated in all four domains can be treated on two distinct levels, namely on a 
general and on a specific niveau. According to the specific levels, modeling components, like 
rationality assumptions and the like, are utilised within one o f the four particular dilemmata areas of 
Table 2, whereas in the general version the peculiarities o f specific utilization contexts do not play a
13 It might be asked to which field the morphological explorations of the present article belongs, since it is neither 
empirical in nature nor concerned with the conceptual structures of social science research nor, for that matter, 
normative in character ... It will become clear, within the subsequent chapters, that another dimension must be added to 
the two-dimensional matrix of Table 1 so that a satisficing location of the morphological approach can be undertaken. By 
chance, this additional dimension will also effectively dissolve the modeling dilemma with which the present article had 
started.
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significant role. For reasons o f deductivity, the modeling dilemma will be dissolved subsequently in its 
general form since this overall solution will, simultaneously, pave the way for the more specific four 
variants, too.
3. The Dissolution-Sketch for the Modeling Dilemma
Having arrived at a general framework for the identification o f language games within the scientific 
system and their relevant rule systems, it should become feasible, finally, to produce a new type, and, 
it must be added, a more successful type o f a general dissolution o f the modeling dilemma. Moreover, 
the following remarks will shed new light on the principal heuristics for different ways o f socio­
economic world-making and for the separate roles of model-building in the social sciences where these 
different approaches can and must be qualified as equally necessary and indispensable.
The starting point consists in the introduction of a new dimension14, which comes originally from 
modal logic and which has started in its modern form with C.I. Lewis already around 1920. 
Accordingly, a differentiation into two reference areas will be undertaken, namely into possible world 
domains and the realm of the actual world.15 (See also HUGHES/CRESSWELL 1985:75ff. or, for 
social science modeling, GILBERT 1981: Iff.) Thus, a very simple two-dimensional morphological 
space assumes the following form:
14 It should be stressed especially at this point that morphological analyses can be undertaken in a variety of different 
ways. More concretely, a new dimension, substituting Bunge's, could be introduced in which the scientific output is 
classified into two broad categories, which have been introduced by Paul K. Lazarsfeld (1941) already in the early 1940's, 
namely into administrative and critical research. Consequently the resulting space of scientific language games covers, on 
the one hand, administrative research both of the empirical and normative type and, on the other hand, critical normative 
as well as critical empirical investigations.
An alternative differentiation could be made by substituting the critical/administrative distinction by a standard/non­
standard separation which should account for the wide variety of scientific practices, ranging from Niklas Luhmann's 
theory of(f?) social systems (1984), from Lyotard's Postmodern Knowledge and the subsequent literature on 
postmodemity (CROOK/PAKULSKFWATERS 1992, WATERS 1994), from Carol Giligan's In a Different Voice (1982) 
to Anthony Giddens' voyages into structuration theory (1984,1990,1991) or to Jim Coleman's attempted unifaction via a 
set of Rational Choice-theories on social actions and interactions (1990)... Moreover, such a partitioning should make it 
clear that a large number of scientific language games and, more importantly, of regional or disciplinary scientific cultures 
exist in which the classic or standard goal-set, consisting of prediction, explanation and control (CASTI 1989:456ff.) is 
replaced by wo/i-standard elements where criteria like the historical scope, the wide range of comparisons, the density of 
analogy-formation, the degree of surprise and novelty etc. occupy the center-stage.
Thus, the morphological analysis along the analytical road offers potentially useful groupings or clusters of scientific 
practices or language games. Moreover, the morphological approach can be undertaken in a self-referential maimer, too. 
Defining a new dimension, in which the morphological partitionings are classified according to the degree of novelty, it 
remains a task for the reader to determine the most appropriate area for the present considerations ...
15 It must be stressed from the beginning that the distinction between actual world and possible worlds is not to be 
confused with a realistic committment. On the contrary, actual world and possible worlds are differentiated in a purely 
pragmatic manner by focussing on differences with respect to rule systems and evaluation criteria for both types of 
operations. To be more precise, the rule systems for actual world practices focus on observation rules, measurement-rules, 
testing-rules and the like which are largely absent in the case of possible worlds-practices.
13
Dimension-; 
empirical normative
possible world Field I Field II
Dimension!
actual world Field III Field IV
Even at this point, no cognitive cash value (Wilfried Sellars) will be recognizable since the partitioning 
into Field I- and Field III-games must, in all probability, lead to a complete marginalization o f the 
model-building efforts within the social sciences, too. By characterizing the bulk o f modeling activities 
as a scientific language game within possible worlds, the modeling activities lie, apparently, within the 
same camp as any type o f bogus science which, after all, can be qualified as sciencQ-fiction, too. But 
at this stage, an explicit reference to the underlying basic pragmatic concepts, namely that o f rules, 
rule systems and evaluation criteria, becomes essential. In the subsequent paragraphs, it will be 
demonstrated in an a priori fashion that, on the one hand, rule systems differ radically for research 
within Field I and within Field III and that, moreover, specific sets o f wow-trivial evaluation criteria 
can be found which differentiate clearly between interesting, fruitful research in each o f the two 
respective fields from their unattractive, trivial or bogus counterparts.
Table 3: A Modal-based Morphological Space for Four Types
of Language Games in the Social Sciences
3.1. Main Differences in the Rule Systems
Consequently, it will and must become the task of the subsequent part to highlight some of the main 
differences with respect to the rule systems for Field I-activities on the one hand and for Field III- 
operations on the other hand. The easiest way to identify major differences consists in the elaboration 
o f two paradigmatic modeling examples, one from the side of actual world-modeling, the other from 
the possible worlds-area. In this manner of exemplar based learning (CHARNIAK/McDERMOTT 
1985), two social models will be presented on the domain of education, one long term model o f the 
Austrian education system focussing on the distribution of pupils across various school-types16, the
!6 For the first model and its subsequent revisions, see especially MÜLLER/LASSNIGG 1992, HAAG/MÜLLER 1992, 
MÜLLER/HAAG 1994, MÜLLER 1995b.
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other one on the French education system and the transition process from the end o f High School either 
to the universities or to the Instituts universitaires de Technologie (IUT).17
Using a master-equation framework (HAKEN 1981, 1983, WEIDLICH/HAAG 1988), 
the distribution o f pupils across various school-types in Austria from 1970 to 1990 has 
been modeled by building up three factor sets determining group behavior in a large scale 
social system. The following explanatory schema has been used -
Changes in school type^ f  {attractivities, barriers, global mobility}
It would require too much space within this article to present a formally accurate account 
o f the overall modeling framweork18, so it must be sufficient, at this stage, to characterize 
it in a  qualitative manner. The set o f barriers, restricting the movement o f pupils across or 
between school-types, consisted o f -
{Legal restrictions19, delays in the schooling career,20 
gender separation in school types21, dualism22}
whereas the attractivity set has been composed of the following elements -
{Synergy parameter (agglomeration)23, expected duration time24, 
capacities25, sectoral distribution of the employment system26}
17 For the French model, see esp. BOUDON 1979:122ff.
18 For more details, see the references quoted in Footnote 17.
19 This factor has been specified in form of a matrix of legally allowd transition between school types, with value 1 for 
legally admitted transition and 0 otherwise.
20 A second matrix on so caWed-SchullauJbahnverluste has been constructed in the following manner: Given the 
reference years for different school forms like five years for Upper Vocational Schools and the like, the time delay 
associated with each of these transitions has been calculated. Consequently, the probability for a change of the school type 
j —» i is assumed to depend also on those expected delays.
21 According to this factor, transitions are assumed to slow down significantly in the case of highly segregated schools, 
the one being predominantly male, the other mainly female.
22 Dualism refers to the split between the university linked school forms and, with the exception of the Primary School, 
the remaining segments and has been formalized as a 1/0 matrix, too.
23 Here, a logistically shaped diffusion process is postulated, assuming that in the case of education systems too, 
agglomeration effects play an essential role.
24 To put it very briefly, those schools which offer, on the average, a long potential time span within the education 
system are considered to be more attractive than ortther forms, where, again on the average, a comparatively short time 
span within the education system is to be expected.
25 This factor is related to the supply side in the eduication system and assumes that capacity problems and bottlennecks 
within a certain school type contribute significantly to the attractivity of the school type.
26 The operationalisation of this factor used the distribution of past and present shares of the primaiy, the secondary and 
the tertiary sector as an appropriate explanatory variable.
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Finally, the outcome of the model-estimation consisted in a reference-scenario for the 
Austrian system o f education in which, by introducing assumptions like average 
migration flows and the like, the distribution o f pupils exhibited the development pattern 
o f Table 4:
Table 4: Changes in the Stock of Pupils in the Austrian School-system 1990 - 200527
REFERENCE
PATTERN
S c h o o l  C o m ­
po s it io n  in  
t h e  Y ea r  1990  
(in  % )
Sc h o o l  C o m ­
p o s it io n  in  
t h e  Y e a r  2005  
( in  % )
PS: 33.31 IV,: 2.03 PS: 32.91 (-0.4) IV,: 1.65 (-0.38)
SP: .72 IV2: .91 SP: .45 (-0.27) IV2: .44 (-0.47)
GS: 21.94 IV3: .92 GS: 16.93 (-5.01) IV3: .76 (-0.16)
AS,: 8.61 IV4: .40 AS,: 13.61 (+5.00) IV4: .25 (-0.15)
SS: .90 UV,: 4.29 SS: .75 (-0.15) UV,: 6.81 (+2.52)
DV,: 3.34 U V 2: .29 DV,: 2.05 (-1.29) UV2: .17 (-0.12)
D V 2: .29 U V 3: 3.26 D V 2: .12 (-0.17) UV3: 7.98 (+4.72)
D V 3: 7.85 UV4: .84 D V 3: 5.84 (-2.01) UV4: 1.64 (+0.80)
D V 4: 2.22 AS2: 5.76 D V 4: 1.38 (-0.84) AS2: 4.49 (-1.27)
PTS: 2.11 PTS: 1.76 (-0.35)
SIMULATIONS
E n t r a n c e -V a r ia t io n  
(S m a l l  In c r e a s e s  
in  M ig r a t io n s ) 
(% -C h a n g e s  t o  R e f e r e n c e  
Sc e n a r io )
PS: +1.75 IV i: +2.81
SP: +1.81 IV2 : +3.11
GS: +4.76 IV3 : +2.37
AS,: +0.00 IV4 : +2.98
SS: +3.57 U V j: +0.58
DV,: + 1.97 U V2 : +1.44
D V 2: +2.63 UV3 : + 1.04
D V 3: +2.22 U V4 : +0.46
FTÛI
+ 1.91 
+4.46
AS2 : +0.25
E n t r a n c e -V a r ia t io n  
(S m a l l  In c r e a se s  
in B ir t h  R a t e s ) 
(% -C h a n g e s  t o  Re f e r e n c e  
Sc e n a r io )
PS: + 7 .16 IV,: + 2 .3 7
SP: + 0 .00 IV2: + 2 .3 6
GS: + 3 .49 IV3: + 2 .9 4
AS,: + 4 .85 IV4: + 2 .95
SS: + 0 .67 UV,: + 1 .53
DV,: + 1 .78 UV2: + 1 .7 5
DV2: + 2 .18 UV3: + 0 .8 7
DV3: +1.21 UV4: + 2 .7 2
DV.: +1 .82 A S2: +2 .73
PTS: +3.23
27 The abbreviations stand for: PS (Primary School), SP (Special Primary School), GS (General Secondary School), AS; 
(Academic Secondary School I, SS (Special Secondary School), DVM (Dual Vocational School), PTS (Polytechnical 
School), IVM (Intermediate Vocational School), UVM(Upper Vocational School), AS2(Academic Secondary School H). 
Furthermore, the index number 1 designates multiple school forms whereas the indices 2 to 4 stand for singular schools 
(2: agriculturally related, 3: industrially linked, 4: service-oriented)
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The Boudon-model starts, first, with actual data from France (BOUDON 1979:112) on 
the distribution o f students in various university segements and the IUT which would 
indicate a Field-I approach, too. The decisive step towards a genuine Field Ill-enterprise 
is made, then, with the introduction o f relevant modeling-assumptions and with the 
subsequent elaboration o f an explanatoryP framework. First, assumptions are postulated 
with respect to the potential benefits o f universities for a cohort of twenty identical 
students in a typical possible worlds-manner: 6 students are assumed to earn a benefit of 
2 money units, 8 students a benefit of one money unit and six will reap no benefits at all, 
whereas the benefits for the IUT are postulated to be one money unit for the entire group 
o f 20. Due to this distribution o f potential benefits, the explanatory scheme highlights a 
significant aggregation problem, since the décision-configuration o f a single person out of 
the cohort o f 20 takes the following form:
Table 5: Utility Matrix for a Single Student in the Cohort of 20
Strategies Number of students who, aside from student, opt for the
for the students university
0 1 2 ... 7 ... 10 .... 15 . ... 20
IUT 1 1 1 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1
University 2 2 2 1.86 ... 1,55 ... 1,25 ... I28
It is interesting to note that Boudon makes the limitations o f his explanatory scheme29 as 
well as the Field-Ill interprtation o f his results30 abundantly clear. He concedes that the
28 The values in the utility matrix are to be understood as expected utilities. Thus, the value 1,86 is the result of a 
configuration in which a student has the chance of 6/7 toeam 2 money units and 1/7 to obtain only one money unit. 
Consequently, (6/7)x2 + (l/7 )x l = 1,86 money units. The other values in the utility matrix are computed in the same 
manner. (See also BOUDON 1979:134)
29 Boudon, or to be more precise: Boudon's translator, wrote the following remarks highly characteristic for a possible 
worlds-approach:
Dieses Modell stellt selbstverständlich eine Idealisierung dar: Es trifft selbstevrständlich nicht zu, daß 
jeder Student sich für genau so gut wie alle anderen Studenten hält; es trifft nicht zu, daß die Studenten 
vollständig über die Spielregeln informiert sind, (BOUDON ¡979:135)
30 With respect to the interpretation of the results, Boudon remains consistently within the confines of a possible worlds- 
language game:
Möglicherweise ist die Ursache flir das Scheitern der Kurzstudienlehrgänge eher in Paradoxien der 
Aggregation individueller Entscheidungen zu suchen als in kulturalistischen Erklärungen (Entwertung 
technischer Bildung usw.). (BOUDON 1979:135)
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modeling framework is a typical possible world-approach only and, more importantly, he 
confines the results to the mere possibility  that problems o f aggregation rather than socio­
cultural factors lie at the heart o f the low acceptance o f IUT in France. The decisive point 
at this stage lies in the fact that Boudon's modelingp account should be and must be 
considered as successful and important simply because it fulfills criteria like the 
reduction o f  complexity, i.e. the reduction o f a  highly complex socio-economic transition 
process to one control-variable only or the counter-intuitive nature o f the results since 
traditional theories o f school transitions (ARROW 1973, BOWMAN 1981, 
PSACHAROPOULOS 1987) have focussed on many different areas except for an 
aggregation problem o f individual choices.
With these two examples it should become easier to follow the distinctions introduced via Table 6 
where the main differences in the scientific practices within Field I-modeling work and Field in ­
activities are summarized.
Table 6: Rule Systems for Two Types of Modeling Practices
F ie l d  I: M o d e l in g  O p e r a t io n s  F ie l d  III: M o d e l in g  Op e r a t io n s
f o r  A c t u a l  W o r l d  f o r  P o s s ib l e  W o r l d s
SetM: Strong Data Set«»: No Data Requirements31
Requirements with respect to - Freedom to choose
- Observability
- Testability
- Measurements
- Tests
Set;.A: Strong Requirements for Non-
Theoretic Modeling Components* 
with respect to -
- Observability
- Testability
Set2,.P: No Requirements fo r  7Vo«-Theoretic 
Modeling ComponentsP - 
Freedom to choose
It should not be considered as a mere coincidence however, that Boudon and so many other writers have followed 
consistently along the basic distinctions which have been introduced in Table 2 and along the different rule systems and 
criteria which are presented in Table 6.
31 As a point o f illustration, the data work necessary for the Field I-education model was in the range of twelve months 
and required an intensive cooperation between statistical offices and the IAS-team. For the Boudon-model however, none 
of the data-collection and data-adaptation procedures was required. Here, an inspired afternoon is sufficient to find an 
approporiate distribution of utility values and the like.
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- Measurements
- Tests
Set3^ : Requirements for Theoretical 
Modeling Components*
Consistent Links 
to the Body of Non- 
Theoretical Elements* and 
Data*
Set3,: Requirements for Theoretical 
Modeling Components?
Consistent Links to
the Body o f Non-Theoretical
ElementSp and DataP
Phrased in a very analogical manner, the rule systems for Field I-work and for Field III-studies differ 
like the standard recipes for conducting empirical social research (BORTZ 1984) from Paul K. 
VeyQxabQnd's Anything goes-m\Q (1978, 1985).
3.2. Main Differences in the Evaluation Criteria
But the rule systems for Field I-research and Field III-practices do not constitute the sole principium  
divisionis, the evaluation criteria32 for these two types o f scientific language games differ radically
32 Evaluation criteria as a pragmatic concept refers to the set of all those attributes by which the actual moves and 
practices within the context of a language game and its rule system can be evaluated. Thus, turning to Wittgenstein's 
famous characterization of games and family resemblances -
Betrachte z.B. einmal die Vorgänge, die wir 'Spiele' nennen. Ich meine Brettspiele, Kartenspiele, 
Ballspiel, Kampfspiele, usw. Was ist allen diesen gemeinsam? - Sag nicht: 'Es muß ihnen etwas 
gemeinsam sein, sonst hießen sie nicht ‘Spiele” - sondern schau, ob ihnen allen etwas gemeinsam ist. - 
Denn, wenn du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht sehen, was allen gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst 
Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften, sehen, und zwar eine ganze Reihe. Wie gesagt: denk nicht, sondern 
schau! - Schau z.B. die Brettspiele an, mit ihren mannigfachen Verwandtschaften. Nun geh zu den 
Kartenspielen über: hier findest du viele Entsprechungen mit jener ersten Klasse, aber viele gemeinsamen 
Züge verschwinden, andere treten auf. Wenn wir nun zu den Ballspielen übergehen, so bleibt manches 
Gemeinsame erhalten, aber vieles geht verloren. - Sind sie alle 'unterhaltend'? Vergleiche Schach mit dem 
Mühlfahren. Oder gibt es überall ein gewinnen und Verlieren, oder eine Konkurrenz der Spielenden? Denk 
an die Patiencen ... Und das Ergebnis dieser Betrachtungen lautet nun: Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz 
von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen. Ich kann 
diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren als durch das Wort 'Familienähnlichkeiten'; denn so 
übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie 
bestehen. (WITTGENSTEIN 1971 :PU 66f.)
one may, in similar fashion, introduce the term of evaluation criteria in the following manner:
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too. Introducing, in the spirit o f historical reachability, the famous Hempel-Oppenheim articles on 
explanation (HEMPEL 1942, HEMPEL/OPPENHEIM 1948), the main evaluation criterion for Field 
I-investigations can be stated in a straightforward manner for it lies in the successful proliferation of 
explanations, predictions and retrodictions where „successful“ should refer to the simultaneous 
fulfillment o f the four explanatory requirements put forward by Hempel and Oppenheim, especially the 
truth condition,33 Field III-evaluations, however, focus on explanations, too, but here a significant 
elimination must take place since the truth conditionA has to be abandoned. Moreover, an additional set 
o f conditions has to be introduced in which criteria like surprise, simplicity, high degree o f 
formalization, empirical reachability („AnschluBfahigkeit“, to borrow a  term from Niklas Luhmann) 
and the like occupy a  predominant role.
Table 7: Evaluation Criteria for Two Distinct Scientific Modeling Practices
F ie ld  I: E v a l u a t i o n  o f  F ie ld  III: E v a l u a t i o n  o f
M o d e l  S o l u t io n s  f o r  t h e  M o d e l  s o l u t io n s  f o r
a c t u a l  w o r l d  p o s s ib l e  w o r l d s
Set,A: EXPLANATIONa (Prediction, 
Retrodiction)
Main Requirements:
- ExplanansA
- ExplanandumA
- Consistency
- TruthA
Set,,: EXPLANATION? (Forward and 
RetrosimulationP)
Main Requirements
- Explanansp
- Explananduirip
- Consistency
Betrachte z.B. einmal die Regeln, die wir ‘Bewertungen von Spielen' nennen. Ich meine Bewertungen von 
Brettspielen, Kartenspielen, Ballspielen, Kampfspielen, usw. Was ist allen diesen gemeinsam? - Sag nicht:
'Es muß ihnen etwas gemeinsam sein, sonst hießen sie nicht ‘Bewertungen von Spielen ” - sondern schau, 
ob ihnen allen etwas gemeinsam ist. - Denn, wenn du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht sehen, was allen 
gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften, sehen, und zwar eine ganze Reihe. Wie 
gesagt: denk nicht, sondern schau! - Schau z.B. die Bewertungsregeln ß ir  Brettspiele an, mit ihren 
mannigfachen Verwandtschaften. Nun geh zu den Kartenspielen über: hier findest du viele 
Entsprechungen mit jener ersten Klasse, aber viele gemeinsamen Züge verschwinden, andere treten auf.
Wenn wir nun zu den Ballspielen übergehen, so bleibt manches Gemeinsame erhalten, aber vieles geht 
verloren. - Werden sie alle nach der Spielerqualität bewertet? Vergleiche reine Glückspiele mit Schach.
Oder gibt es überall ein Gewinnen und Verlieren? Denk an das Spiel, sich einen Ball zuzuweifen. Oder 
eine Konkurrenz der Spielenden? Denk an die Patiencen ... Und das Ergebnis dieser Betrachtungen lautet 
nun: Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen. 
Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen. Ich kam diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren als 
durch das Wort 'Familienähnlichkeiten'; denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen 
Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen. (WITTGENSTEIN I97LPU  66f.)
33 It goes (almost) without saying that, due to the overall pragmatic context, the truth condition has to be interpreted in a 
pragmatic manner too, i.e. with reference to rule-systems. Consequently, truth means the satisfaction or the following of 
specific rule systems.
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Set^: ADDmONAL VALUE
(Improved Understandig of 
the Socio-economic Universes)
Set2.P: ADDmONAL VALUE
(Improved Understanding o f the 
Socio-economic Universes)
SimulationsA 
InnovationA 
Policy Relevance/6 
Generalizability*38 
Surprising* Results
Mastering o f Complexity 
Above Average Degree 
o f Formalization41
CongruencyA
Simulations?
InnovationP 
Policy Relevance?37 
GeneralizabilityP39 
Counter-intuitiveP Results 
(Paradoxes, Critical Thresholds, etc.) 
Reduction o f Complexity 
High Degree o f Formalization40
Testability in Principle („AnschluB- 
fahigkeit“)
Congruency?43
Thus, model accounts, ranking high on the criteria setsP, will be qualified as successes, innovative, or 
imaginative irrespective o f their extremely low correspondence to actual data, observations or 
measurements. A rational choice account on the optimal course o f a psychic depression or on an 
optimal allocation o f manic-depressive phases during one's life cycle will and must become, if 
successful along the evaluation setP, a potentially interesting focus o f discussion. Once again, a
34 It should be emphasized that the variations, introduced in a Field I-simulation, must follow the normal Field I-criteria.
35 Likewise, simulations,, are typically un-restricted and can be put forward with the fullest freedom of choice.
36 Within Field I, a direct connection can be established between model*-work, simulations* and the corresponding 
policy advices*,
37 For Field HI, policy advice can be given too, which must be couched, however, in an indirect manner, i.e. as possible 
worlds-advice on potential problem areas, etc. For a typical advice of this type, see the discussion of robert Axelrod's 
book in the following chapter.
38 GeneralizabilityA means the extension from one area of application* to other empirical* domains.
39 Contrary to the Field 1-meaning, generalizabilityP consists mainly in the removal of specific restrictions by their non­
restricted counterparts (e.g., from 2 person games to n person games, from perfect information to imperfect information, 
etc.)
40 For Field El, the linking of modeling work with recent advances in mathematics or statistics must be seen as an 
essential and very impoprtant evaluation criterion.
41 Within Field I however, it is regarded, normally, as a special success if medium types of formalization can be utilised 
for empirical* data.
42 Congruency* is a typical residual category, comprising additional evaluation standards for Field I. In order to present 
an aoperational definition, congruency* can be equated with those elements which one may find in David F. Hendry 
fl 987), but not in Table 7.
43 Similarly, congruency,, can be considered as the set of those evaluation criteria for Field Ill-investigations which are 
explicitly mentioned in Hendry (1987), but not in Table 7.
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counter-intuitive example might be helpful to demonstrate the universal applicability o f the rational 
mode o f attribution for evidently inappropriate configurations. The example itself is devoted to the 
topic o f altruism  and is couched, moreover, in a typical Field III-manner:
First, a possible world situation is built up, by postulating two persons, father and son, 
by focussing on intergenerational transfers and, moreover, by assuming a single 
consumption commodity, -
Let C denote the sole consumption good, com, the total amount of which we fix 
arbitrarily. Suppose all this com is initially under the father's control. The level of com  
consumed by an individual affects his pleasure. We refer to this direct pleasure as 
‘felicity’ and describe it by functions .... (STARK 1995:15f.)
Second, altruism is introduced via a simple scalar ß, -
the weight that one places on the utility of the other relative to one’s own felicity.
(IBID: 16)
Third, the optimal consumption level both for the consumption o f the father as well as 
that o f the son is calculated, yielding a solution where -
the father’s optimal allocation is such that he wishes to consume a larger proportion of 
corn than his son wishes him to consume (IBID: 18)
Finally, several implications are drawn from this analytic solution, by pointing out to the 
beneficiary role o f altruism for producing mutually agreeable transfers, by showing that 
altruism, while reducing conflict, does not eliminate it, or by demonstrating that a  rise in 
altruism may result in a worse outcome for both parties involved. (IBID:19ff.)
More generally, any phenomenon of the social worlds, from marriages and family life (BECKER 
1981) to seemingly remote areas like health and sickness, feelings, including, pace  ELSTER (1992), 
those of shame, can legitimately become an object of a possible worlds-investigation within the context 
of the rational stance. Likewise, everyday calculations, management behaviour or the activities of 
scientists can be subject to a normative stance (ELSTER 1990), an emotional stance (ELSTER 
1992), or an ethnographic stance. (LATOUR 1987, 1991, LAVE 1989)44
On the other hand, complex Field I-models focussing, for example, on group behavior and a habitual 
stance, can be extended to areas outside the existing set of paradigmatic applications*: from migration 
(WEIDLICH/HAAG 1988), sectoral employment (MÜLLER/HAAG 1994) into more remote areas 
like politics (ERDMANN 1986, HOFINGER/GRÜTZMANN 1994), innovation and diffusion 
dynamics (WEIDLICH/HAAG 1983, MENSCH/WEIDLICH/HAAG 1991, ZHANG 1991), cognitive 
dynamics (MÜLLER 1992, 1993). Moreover, successful Field I-models can and must be, if  possible,
44 On concepts like intentional stance, rational stance, emotional stance, etc. see especially chapter 5 of the present 
article.
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combined to comparatively larger scale models, leading thus to a steady increase for predictionsA and 
simulationsA.
4. Epistemic Cultures in the Social Sciences
Having reached, by now, a successful dissolution of the modeling dilemma by focussing on two highly 
differentiated sets o f rules and evaluations, the next step will carry the preceding result one step further 
by generalizing it even further. For this purpose, the introduction o f a new concept will become 
necessary, namely that o f an epistemic culture, which has been proposed first by Karin Knorr-Cetina 
in order to describe clusters o f essential scientific activities and practices.(KNORR 1992b)45 An 
epistemic culture, then, consists o f a set of basic scientific research operations which must be 
considered as highly typical with respect to the fabrication o f a particular knowledge domain and, 
more general, to the orchestration and organisation of particular areas o f investigation.
The notion (of epistemic culture, K.H.M.) foregrounds not only the difference between the 
notion of a laboratory and the concept of experiment traditionally defined, it also foregrounds 
the disunity of the sciences in regard to the meaning of the empirical, the enactment of object 
relations, the construction and fashioning of the social within science.(KNORR-CETINA 
1992b:3)
More specifically, epistemic cultures typify special and unique relations to their cognitive as well as to 
their outside environment. In this sense, Knorr-Cetina distinguishes, within the context o f the natural 
sciences, two dominant epistemic cultures, one located in the area o f high-energy physics and 
described in terms o f a closed and self-contained type o f knowledge production, the other situated in 
areas like molecular biology, where open processes of trial and error dominate the research scenes.
45 It must be noted that the introduction of the recent concept of epistemic culture does not violate the principle of 
historical reachability since, once again, Otto Neurath had already in the 1930's and early 1940's proposed a 
Gelehrtenbehavioristik where one could find the following remarks -
Sociologists deal, among other things, with tools and tales, with the language o f  magic, theology, 
jurisprudence, economics, and pedagogics; but also with the language used by the sociologists 
themselves, with their statements and their habits, i.e. with the behavioristics o f  sociologists ... We have 
fine questionnaires as fa r  as preliterate tribes are concerned but hardly any when we tty  to ask 
sociologists how they themselves behave in arguing and writing. Since sociological predictions are 
directly connected with actions which create what has been predicted, the difficulty is very 
understandable. More than in other sciences, taboos and old folklore come into the picture when human 
actions are under consideration. (NEURATH 1971;42f.)
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Once again, the principal ways to arrive at a meaningful and empirically grounded notion o f epistemic 
cultures can proceed along two different lines:
The first route, undertaken for example by Knorr-Cetina, makes use o f an intensive, 
methodologically sophisticated inspection46 of the actual practices o f scientific day- to 
day activities in the context o f laboratories -
The laboratory allowed ... to consider the technical activities o f science within the wider 
context o f equipment and symbolic practices within which they are embedded ... In other 
words, the study of laboratories has brought to the fore the full spectrum of activities 
involved in the production o f knowledge. (IBID.)
Via a rich theoretical background, Knorr-Cetina achieves a successful ordering and 
clustering o f the mass o f empirical protocols, and arrives, in the end, at an empirically 
well-founded separation between main types or clusters of scientific research activities.
The second way however, does proceed in a morphological and a priori manner, 
separating between principal components o f scientific operations and arriving, then, at a 
variety o f possible configurations and recombinations. These possible types o f scientific 
operations possess the status o f potentially fruitful and enlightening conjectures which 
need further empirical collaborations to determine their actual distribution or their 
historical development path.
Since the subsequent remarks will follow along a possible worlds-strategy, the evaluation criteria for 
the usefulness o f the identification o f epistemic cultures in the social sciences are clear. The 
distinctions must clearly exhibit a heuristic surplus-value, i.e. they must rank high with respect to 
evaluation criteria like reduction o f  complexity, counter-intuitive insights, innovative content, 
,^inschlufifdhigkeitli and the like ...
Again, like in the preceding chapters on two types o f modeling, an exemplar-bastd approach will be 
chosen in which two sets o f products, highly typical for two different epistemic social science cultures, 
will be introduced and discussed.
The first example comes from a classic on classics, namely from John Madge's book on 
the origins o f scientific sociology (MADGE 1962). In this volume, Madge gives a 
detailed account o f path-breaking studies from Emile Durkheim's analysis o f suicide and 
anomy (DURKHEIM 1983) to Leon Festinger's and Harold H. Kelley's investigations on 
attitude changes through social contacts (FESTINGER/KELLEY 1951). Between these 
two poles, one finds, within Madge's volume, a large number o f sociological projects,
46 In Kj io it ' s case, ethnomethodology, phenomenology of the Merleau-Ponty style as well as a strong reference to Michel 
Foucault's work form the theoretical background for the interpretative work on science observed.
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ranging from William I, Thomas'and F. Znaniecki's books on The Polish Peasant in 
Europe and America (THOMAS/ZNANIECKI 1918-1920), from the Chicago School 
and, more specifically, from H.W. Zorbough's The Gold Coast and the Slum  (1929) to 
the studies on the rise and the roots o f fascism by the Frankfurt Institute (ACKERMANN 
et al. 1976) and to Robert F. Bales' account on Interaction Process Analysis (BALES 
1950) In a final chapter on The Lessons, Madge turns to the question o f similarities and 
characteristic traits for major works in sociology and arrives, after reviewing the methods 
and techniques used in a comparative manner, at the following conclusion.
Against this background the characteristic novelty of the works introduced in this book 
becomes apparent. Each item of research is unremittingly empirical and, like the 
products of the social-survey movement, almost all the studies are immidiately concerned 
with the alleviation of current social problems. At the same time, almost without 
exception, each study makes a concurrent contribution to verifiable knowledge. 
(MADGE 1962:537)
The social sciences, by employing documents, interviews and observations from and 
within their socio-economic environments, have apparently developed, over the last 
hundred years, a distinctive epistemic culture which is, following Madge's observations, 
both empiricallyA and policyA oriented.47
The second example has more recent origins and is the widely cited and acclaimed book 
by Robert Axelrod on the evolution o f cooperation (AXELROD 1984). The research 
operations necessary for this type of study differ very significantly from the first series o f 
classical sociological investigations. First, the direct connex with social problems and 
their reduction is not given any more although Axelrod discusses at length an actual 
world-example, namely the live-and let-live system in trench warfare in World War I  
(AXELROD 1984:73ff.). Second, the data base is not established via questionnaires, 
observations or interviews from the manifold of life-worlds but within the social 
laboratory itself.48 More precisely, a typical possible worlds-configuration is set up for 
iterated games o f the PD (prisoner's dilemma) which offers, for each player, two 
strategies, namely cooperation (C) and defection (D) and which exhibits a payoff-
47 On the importance of the policy-side and on the close linkages between state apparatus and social sciences, see esp. 
WAGNER 1990.
48 One might object immediately that Axelrod's computer tournament required a substantial postal input from outside, 
namely all the strategy suggestions for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. But this specific detail is irrelevant to the present 
questions of data sources since a morphological analysis within the laboratory itself would have yielded a similar 
combination of strategies. One might argue, however, that Axelrod's computer tournament has to say very much on the 
sociology of science as well because it reveals the preferences of scientists engaged in game theory, evolutionary biology 
and the lik e ...
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distribution o f 5 (T for temptation to defect), 3 (R for reward for cooperation), 1 (P for 
punishment for mutual defection) and 0 (S for sucker's payoff). Third, the prevalent mode 
o f investigation lies in a computer simulation, i.e. in simulations which take place within 
the context o f the laboratory itself. In the case of Axelrod, the design o f a computer 
tournament has been chosen in which basically all strategies admitted were allowed to 
play against each other. Fourth, and very importantly, the results of the tournament, viz. 
a rank-ordering o f strategies, were subject to a second order analysis with respect to 
common attributes which could be identified for successful tournament strategies, a 
validation move which might be qualified as typical for possible worlds-modeling. Fifth, a 
set o f rules has been formulated which one should follow in socio-economic 
configurations o f the PD-type with pay-offs sufficiently similar to a 5,3,1,0-distribution -
Don't be envious (llOflf.), Don't be the first to defect (113ff.), Reciprocate both 
cooperation and defection (118ff.), Don't be too clever (120ff.)
Sixth, and finally, the fourth part of Axelrod's book is devoted, under the heading o f How 
to Promote Cooperation (AXELROD 1984:124) - to reformers and offers advice 
consistent with the design and the result o f his study. Thus, Axelrod has definitely an 
extremely important political advice to offer -
Enlarge the shadow of the future (126ff.), Change the payoffs (133f.), Teach people to 
care about each other (134ff.), Teach reciprocity (136ff.), Improve recognition abilities 
(139ff.)
although the results and the scientific basis for these devices have been confined, 
throughout the study, to the laboratory alone
From these two highly significant examples it becomes relatively easy to find an inductive 
generalisation to the notion o f epistemic cultures. In social science areas like sociology or in political 
science49, the traditional and predominant mode o f knowledge production has been clustered within an 
epistemic culture which can be described by attributes like a focus on the actual world (empiricaU) 
and openness (data generation for processes outside the social science laboratory), whereas the 
Axelrod book is one o f the most prominent examples of an entirely different epistemic culture with
49 It must be pointed out that economics, since the introduction of the utility synthesis during the 1870’s, may be 
considered as the leading discipline away from the confines and principles of the traditional epistemic culture. Moreover, 
it would be an extremely enlightening research objective to frame the debates, starting around the so-called 
Methodenstreit until to the present time, within the conceptual apparatus of dominant epistemic cultures, assimilation 
attempts to it and a new epistemic culture in the making...
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opposite attributes: with a focus on possible worlds (empirical?), and closure (data generation within 
the social science laboratory itself). Via a two case-inductivism, one is led, therefore, to the following 
table which, once again, highlights significant differences between two epistemic cultures within the 
social sciences.50
Table 8: Two Epistemic Cultures in the Social Sciences I - Principal Components
Dimension2 
open closed
actual world  Epistemic Culture I [Intermediaries I]
Dimension]
possible worlds [Intermediaries II] Epistemic Culture II
Seen from a history o f science-perspective, it would become an extremely challenging, albeit rewarding 
reserach task to describe the evolution o f theoretical economics or econometrics as a consecutive path 
from the upper left area, via the intermediary station II, to the lower right side o f Table 8. Moreover, 
from the preceding table, a conjecture can be put forward that only over the last decades, starting with 
the diffusion o f new information processing technologies, a separation into at least two major 
epistemic cultures has been established which can be summarized via Table 9:
Table 9: Two Epistemic Cultures in the Social Sciences II - Main Characteristics
EPISTEMIC CULTURE I: Open Rule Systems EPISTEMIC CULTURE II: Closed Rule Systems
for the Actual World for Possible Worlds
Main Focus 
with Respect to
D a t a  Observable, Non-
Experimental Processes 
Data with Strong 
Quality restrictions
50 It should be added, once again, that the distinctions between the two epistemic cultures just introduced should be 
considered by no means as exhaustive. On the contrary, especially within the social sciences, it should become very useful 
to distinguish between a variety of epistemic cultures, some of them being confined to special territories, some of them to 
a specific cluster of disciplines, etc. With respect to modeling operations however, the separation between just two 
epistemic cultures should be considered both as necessary and sufficient.
Laboratory Data, 
Experimental Data, 
Artificial Data
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(Reliability, Validity)
THEORY AND
M o d e l in g
Grounded Theory; 
Middle-range Theories 
Grand Foundations51
Highly Formalized 
Theories
G e n r e s 52 Thick Descriptions53: 
Explanation sketches*,
Thin Formalizations: 
Model-Explanationsp, 
Model-Simulationsp,
Model-Explanations*
Model-Simulations*
Explanation skecthes?
Thus, the hypothetical identification o f at least two epistemic cultures within the social sciences must 
be considered as the most general dissolution o f the modeling dilemma. Due to this overall separation, 
one is invited, therefore, to distinguish clearly between two types of modeling and simulation within the 
contemporary social sciences, one labelled modeling* and adhering to the traditional, open-oriented
51 Especially within sociology, a remarkable feature lies in an excessive pre-occupation of reconfiguring the entire 
discipline anew. From Talcott Parsons Theory o f  Social Action (1961) onward, one finds, over the last decades, a wide 
range of very comprehensive foundation attempts, culminating in voluminous works by HABERMAS (1981), 
LUHMANN (1984), MÜNCH (1988, 1993), etc.
52 Concluding, in an analogical spirit, the horizontal tour on games, rules, evaluation criteria and genres, one could adapt 
the Wittgensteinian original by the following variant -
Betrachte z.B. einmal die Gegenstände, die wir 'Spielausstattungen' nennen. Ich meine die Ausstattungen 
von Brettspielen, Kartenspielen, Ballspielen, Kampfspielen, usw. Was ist allen diesen gemeinsam? - Sag 
nicht: 'Es muß ihnen etwas gemeinsam sein, sonst hießen sie nicht 'Spielausstattungen' - sondern schau, 
ob ihnen allen etwas gemeinsam ist. - Denn, wenn du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht sehen, was allen 
gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften, sehen, und zwar eine ganze Reihe. Wie 
gesagt: denk nicht, sondern schau! - Schau z.B. die Ausstattungen ß ir  Brettspiele an, mit ihren 
mannigfachen Verwandtschaften. Nun geh zu den Kartenspielen über: hier findest du manche 
Entsprechungen mit jener ersten Klasse, aber sehr viele Gemeinsamkeitene verschwinden, andere treten 
auf. Wenn wir nun zu den Ausstattungen ß ir  Ballspiele tibergehen, so bleibt manches Gemeinsame 
erhalten, aber vieles geht verloren. - Brauchen sie alle ein Spielmaterial? Vergleiche Schach mit dem 
Stein-Schere-Papier-Knobeln von Kindern. Oder gibt es überall einen besonderen Ort? Und wie steht es 
mit der Kleidung? ... Das Ergebnis dieser Betrachtungen lautet nun: Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von 
Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen. Ich kann 
diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren als durch das Wort ‘Familienähnlichkeitendenn so 
übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie 
bestehen. (WITTGENSTEIN 1971 :PU 66f.)
53 The concept of a thick description refers to the phenomenon that within the traditional epistemic culture a very large 
number of books has been produced which cover hundreds and hundreds of pages and which, by and large, qualify as 
descriptive frameworks. (See e.g. the extremely stimulating discussion on the impossibility of transforming a thick and 
volumnious description, namely S:P. Huntington's book on modernization (HUNTINGTON 1968), into a thin and 
consistent model in the article by Krause in this volume)
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epistemic cultureA, the other one characterized as modelingT and being the core element of a new type 
o f epistemic cultureP, namely that o f a closed laboratory settingp. Table 10 summarizes the separation 
o f two modeling approaches in which many essential ingredients like explanations, simulations, 
predictions, retrodiction, control, etc. should be used with appropriate subindices - A or P - in order to 
facilitate the identification of the scientific language games pursued.
Table 10: Two Modeling Approaches in the Social Sciences
actual world
Dimension, 
possible world
Dimension,
open
Epistemic CultureA 
{ModelingA}
closed
Epistemic CultureP 
{Modeling?}
A final argument can be put forward which should demonstrate, once again, the heuristic value o f the 
basic differentiations introduced here. Within the social sciences, the next decades will experience a 
tremendous surge in modeling approaches, which, to varying degrees, belong to the set of complex 
models. (See, aside from the literature quoted in Footnote 6, also CAMPBELL/ECKE/HYMAN 1992, 
CRILLY/EARNSHAW/JONES 1991, KAYE 1993) This modeling revolution which has been well 
under way for the last decade already will make it almost imperative to separate clearly between 
modelp-approaches and their modelA-counterparts for, within the small survey on recent model 
advances in the sciences of complexity presented in Table 11 (below), one finds many model families 
which can be utilized within a modelingA-environment as well as in a modeling? context. Moreover, the 
emergence o f virtual laboratories -
A virtual laboratory can be divided into two components: the application programs, data files 
and textual descriptions that describe the experiments; and the system support that provides the 
framework on which these domain-dependent experiments are built 
(PRUSINKIEWICZ/LINDENMAYER 1990:194) -
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will exert a considerable impact on the rapid development of the epistemic culture? and, consequently, 
on the course o f the co-evolution between the new epistemic culture and its long established 
counterpart.54
Table 11: Survey of Complex Models
TRADEMARKS CORE-DOMAINS HEURISTICS
AUTOPOIESIS Biology, 
Artificial 
Intelligence, 
Theories of 
Action, et al.
Organisation/ 
Structure; Closed­
ness, Autonomy; 
Recursiveness; Obser- 
ver-dependence, etc.
Ce l l u l a r  A u t o m a t a Engineering, Physics, 
Biology, Demography, 
Sociology, et al.
Von Neumann-neigh- 
borhood, Moore-neigh- 
borhood, etc.
Ch a o s -t h e o r y Dimension- 
theory, Meteoro­
logy, et al.
Strange Attrac­
tors', Mandelbrot- 
Set; Julia-Set; Ljapunov 
Coefficients, etc.
C l a s s f i e r  S y s t e m s  
a n d  E v o l u t io n a r y  
Pr o g r a m m in g
C o m p l e x it y  T h e o r y
Engineering, Psychology, 
Science o f Science, Artificial 
Intelligence, Artificial Life et al.
Computer Science, Artificial 
Intelligence, Linguistics,
Biolgy, et al.
Bucket-Brigade Algor­
ithms, Cross-over, 
Schema-Theorem etc.
Deterministic Turing- 
Machines, NP-problems 
etc.
D is s ip a t iv e  S t r u c ­
t u r e s
Nonequilibrium  
Thermodynamics, 
Chemistry, et al.
Disturbance-para- 
meters; Brüssela- 
tor, etc.
E v o l u t io n a r y
Ga m e t h e o r y
Biology, Neuro­
physiology, 
Sociology, et al.
Evolutionary 
Stable Stra­
tegies (ESS), etc.
54 Again, a final remark becomes appropriate to point to the fact of a multitude o f epistemic cultures within the 
contemporary social sciences, especially at the regional or the gender level. With respect to modeling activities however, 
the separation between two dominant cultures should be, so the argument, both necessary - and suffiecient.
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GROUP-THEORY
H y per c y c les
NEURAL NETWORKS
Po pu la tio n  D y n a m ic s
SYNERGETICS
Mathematics, Quantum 
Mechanics, Chemistry, 
Psychology et al.
Biochemistry, 
Chemistry, et al.
Computer Science, 
Brain Reserach, Arti­
ficial Intelligence, et al.
Biology, Ethology, 
Demography, So­
ciology et al.
Laser-research, 
Physics, Pattern 
Recognition et al
Symmetry-operations,
Symmetry-groups,
etc.
Families of 
Nonlinear
Equation Systems, etc.
Backpropagation; 
Delta rule, etc.
Selection Models, 
Predator-Prey- 
Models, etc.
Masterequation; 
Fokker-Planck- 
Equation; Slaving 
Principle; Control- 
and Orderparameters, 
etc.
THEORY OF 
Ca t a str o ph es
Differential- 
topolgy, 
Biology, 
Sociology, et al.
Families of 
Generic Equa­
tions; Typology of 
Bifurcations, etc.
With these distinctions it should be easier to accept that modeling in the social sciences adheres to 
different epistemic cultures and that, moreover, modeling can be performed in two highly differentiated 
manners: either as a Field I-practice which sticks to the main principles o f the traditional epistemic 
culture or as a Field III-operation which follows a different set of rules and, even more importantly, of 
evaluation criteria.55 With the present article it is hoped for that the basic distinctions between
55 It would be an extremely interesting task to apply the notion of epistemic regimes (Björn Wittrock) to the cognitive as 
well as to the socio-economic transformations of the period from 1970 to the present time in order to arrive at a 
comprehensive general framework in which the emergence of a new epistemic culture, based on closed laboratory 
research and possible worlds-accounts, could be related to massive changes in the technological settings of laboratories 
across the social sciences as well as to a growing disenchantment between the predominant discourse-coalitions of the late 
1960’s and early 1970’s. (For the process of consecutive epistemic regimes from 1800 to 1970, see esp. WTTTROCK
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modelingp and modeling*, between modeling rulesA and modeling rulesP, and, finally, between 
evaluation criteriaA and evaluation criteria? can be considered both as necessary and sufficient for a 
satisficing  dissolution o f the modeling dilemma and, consequently, for an adequate understanding and 
interpretation o f the role and function o f rationality assumptions within the social sciences.
5. Schumpeter Revisited
So far, the article has concentrated on the overall solution for the modeling dilemma and, more 
specifically, to the four Schumpeterian problem areas of rationality only. The general dissolution, 
however, has the distinctive advantage o f being applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the specific four 
areas-set, introduced in Table 2, too.
In order to stick to the format o f a  single article and not to the reference frame of a booklet on social 
science methodology, only a bare methodology sketch can be presented to arrive at similar satisficing 
answers for the specific four problem fields o f the original Schumpeter article. The most important 
move, which, however, would have been a highly unlikely one for the realist Schumpeter 
(SCUMPETER 1989), consists in a radically constructivist turn by pointing to the unavoidable and 
necessary role o f the observer.56 Following more recent advances initiated by Heinz von Foerster 
(1985), Ernst von Glasersfeld (1986), Humberto R. Maturana (1985), Jean Piaget (1973, 1983, 1985, 
1992) or Francisco J. Varela (1989), the role of the observer must be transformed from an unavoidable 
nuisance backstage to that o f a central main stage-actor. According to this turn o f Bringing the 
observer back in (WATZLAWICK/KRIEG 1991), any account o f the socio-economic worlds, by 
necessity, is bound to be observer-dependent. In this spirit, rational decision theory (see, e.g. 
BACHARACH/HURLEY 1994) becomes an external mode of attribution no less than the intentional 
stance (Daniel C. Dennett) which, following DENNETT (1987), can be used as an attribution 
strategy for the whole animate and, at least partly, for the inanimate world, too:
Do people actually use this strategy? Yes, all the time. There may someday be other strategies 
for attributing belief and desire and for predicting behavior, but this is the only one we all know 
now. And when does it work? It works with people almost all the time ... The strategy also 
works on most other mammals most of the time. For instance, you can use it to design better
1993) Likewise, the distinctions between two different modes of knowledge production, namely mode I and mode D 
(GIBBONS et al. 1994, NOWOTNY 1995), might serve as an interesting overall reference frame, too.
56 In Chapter 5, the condition of historical reachability is to be abandoned. This requirement has been employed to 
demonstrate that all essential cognitive ingredients would had been available in the 1940’s or 1950’s already to solve the 
modeling dilemma. The subsequent remarks in the chapter on Schumpeter Revisited are directed to a contemporary 
solution of the rationality problems in four specific areas of investigation.
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traps to catch those mammals, by reasoning about what the creature knows or believes about 
various things, what it prefers, what it wants to avoid. The strategy works on birds, and on fish, 
and on reptiles, and on insects and spiders, and even on such lowly and unenterprising creatures 
as clams ... It also works on some artifacts ... The strategy even works for plants ... It even 
works for such inanimate and apparently undesigned phenomena as lightning. An electrician 
once explained to me how he worked out how to protect my underground water pump from 
lightning damage: lightning, he said, always wants to find the best way to ground, but 
sometimes it gets tricked into taking second-best paths. (DENNETT 1987:2If.)
Thus, a contemporary partitioning57 of the four areas for rationality problems in particular and 
modeling components in general can, then, be put forward in the subsequent fashion, where the 
Schumpeterian internal/external dimension is operationally defined in the following manner: 
Descriptions o f neural states or emergent descriptions of such states must be located on the internal 
pole and modes o f behavior-attribution - the intentional, emotional, ethnographic stances ... - on the 
external side. Likewise, relations between an observer and her or his environment can be qualified as 
.^//-referential whereas relations between a scientific observer and her or his fields outside one's own 
environment is to be categorized as referential.
Table 12: A contem porary morphological space for the four rationality problems
Dimension,
observer/
observer
(self-referential)
observer/
observed
(referential)
internal Area I
(neural states)
Dimensionj
external Area III
(modes of attribution for 
actions or practices
Area II
Area IV
57 It must be noted that the requirement of historcial reachability, after having dissolved the modeling dilemma in a 
satisficing manner, is dropped for the subsequent modeling sketch which, therefore, will be concerned mainly with 
contemporary advances within the social sciences and related cognitive domains.
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Not surprisingly, a wide array o f research topics and of different modeling approaches, depending on 
their Field I- or on their Field III-localisation, can be used. Starting with the problem classes for which 
all o f the examples have been chosen58, the following specific additions and qualifications become 
necessary:
Area IV: Classically, Area IV belongs to the core-domain o f micro-sociology, micro­
economics, micro-political science and the like. The preceding discussion should have 
pointed out the heuristic value and the usefulness for distinguishing clearly between Field 
I-approaches and Field III-analyses especially in this domain. Moreover, models o f the 
homo oeconomicus variety are most efficiently utilized within Field Ill-work where they 
fulfil the necessary rule-requirements and evaluation criteria in a surprisingly successful 
manner.59 Only very rarely however, models, focussing on rational decision procedures or 
on game-theoretic frameworks, should and can be employed in Field ¡-investigations.
Area II: For these fields, a cognitive revolution on cognitivism or, to use a  book-title by 
Michael Gazzaniga, on the cognitive neuro-sciences has occured (GAZZANIGA 1995) 
whereby the internal neuro-states o f individuals become subject to a  rapidly increasing 
variety either o f Field I- or to Field III-explorations. Taking a separation from the domain 
o f Artificial Life (LANGTON 1989, LANGTON et al. 1992, LANGTON 1994, 
VARELA/BOURGINE 1992) it becomes useful to separate the research-areas, aside 
from the traditional micro-level, into two additional domains. On the one hand, a basic or 
fento-area can be distinguished, where
tasks like ... wandering, avoiding obstacles, wall following, looking for a certain object,
delivering some object, cleaning the floor, following someone, etc. (BROOKS 1992:436)
60
become the central focus of investigation. On the other hand, a meso or /wo-dom ain (see, 
e.g. AINSLIE 1992) can be identified whose main research interest lies in the problem of 
task-integration. Thus, the following three areas o f investigations can be put forward for 
this relatively recent area of «^¿ra/-based social sciences:
58 It should be added that the dissolution of the modeling dilemma is not confined to the examples from micro­
economics or micro-sociology alone, but can be, in principle, reformulated for any level in the social science-complex: 
from ist macro-macro-levels well to the level of pico-economics, fento-sociology and the like ...
59 Thus, the verve of contemporary criticism against homo oeconomicus modeling, like the one from Etzioni (1994) or, 
to a lesser extent, from Friedberg (1995), must be seen as valid with respect to its comparative disadvantages in Field I 
and as highly invalid with respect to the successes within Field HI.
60 It must be stressed, however, that in the articles by Rodney Brooks one finds a separation into m/cro-domains, macro- 
areas and the ecological level which, following the terminology introduced here, corresponds to the fento- pico- and 
m/cro-distinctions. The new terminology has been chosen for two reasons. First, Ainslie's book on pico-economics (1992) 
has become a well-known social science standard for problems of conflicts within persons. Second, the micro- macro­
dualism is very much entrenched in the current social science literature and has acquired, by now, relatively clear 
boundaries.
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First, tasks (Rodney A. Brooks), drafts (Daniel C. Dennett) or agents (Marvin 
Minsky), at the fento-, pico- and micro-level, especially for senso-motoric 
processes like walking, seeing, grasping, hearing, and the like ...
Second, recursive couplings, especially, but, pace Luhmann (1988, 1990), not 
exclusively communications, at the fento, pico- and micro-level...
Third, disturbances, again on all three levels o f investigation, and their 
corresponding neural settings. (For more details, see MÜLLER 1991)
In Area II, rationality will play a major role, especially in the form o f principles of 
maximization, minimization or optimality which become essential for the explanatory 
frameworks for the interaction patterns of neural groups, both for Field I- and for Field 
III-studies. (See, esp. EDELMAN 1989, 1992, 1993)
The remaining two domains belong to the discipline o f science o f science since they focus on the 
actions and practices o f scientists (Area III) or on the neuro-settings o f scientists (Area I). More 
precisely, the following reserach topics can be identified which, once again, can be dealt within a 
modeling* or modeling? approach:
Area III: Once again, the same model-types which are at the disposal for Area IV, can be 
applied to the scientific realm, too. Moreover, extremely interesting moves toward self- 
referentiality could be accomplished since the modeling frameworksA.p can be used for 
purposes o f //"-explanations, too. Take, for example, a Field I-model which is couched 
in a master-equation scheme and which is specified to capture the cognitive dynamics 
within a scientific domain or discipline (MÜLLER 1994b), then, via a consistent process 
o f self-specification and data-collection, an explanatory scheme for the most likely 
diffusion trajectories o f this type of model can be built up. Like in the case o f Area IV, 
homo oeconomicus-variations will play an essential role in Field III-explorations on the 
economics o f research, on the detection of possible critical limits in diffusion processes, 
on paradoxical results with respect to innovation patterns and the like ....
Area I: Finally, establishing links between advances in the cognitive sciences with an in- 
depth analysis o f the neural ensmebles of scientists might turn out, in the future, as an 
extremely valuable research road. Again, typical Field III-approaches like the utilization 
o f genetic algorithms (HOLLAND et al. 1986, HOLLAND 1992, KOUZA 1993) or, 
alternatively, PET-tomography and similar experimental routes along Field I should 
become a  frequently used research tool for neuro-based investigations o f  science in action 
(Bruno Latour). Once again, rationality will occupy a central stage, especially since 
principles o f maximization, minimization or optimality will become essential explanatory 
framworks for the interaction patterns o f neural groups, both for Field I- and for Field
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Ill-investigations. (See, e.g. HANSON/OLSON 1990, KOCH/SEGEV 1991, or WISE 
1987)
Thus, the unfinished article by Joseph A. Schumpeter could be completed along the main lines just 
outlined. At this stage however, a major research task is still unfinished and will become the central 
topic in the next chapter.
6. Rescue Operations
The preceding discussions have made it clear why the escape strategies characterized in the first part 
o f the present article suffer from incurable shortcomings since they are centered, as will be shown in 
this concluding summary, on one side of the two epistemic modeling cultures in the social sciences 
only. A quick overview will reveal which escape strategies follow which type o f modeling 
arrangement:
ABANDONMENT: The path o f sticking to be a theorist must be considered as a typical 
Field III-strategy only, where the role o f data, data collection, measurement errors or 
model-testing play a relatively insignificant role. Taking the first three advices by David 
F. Hendry seriously -
Think brilliantly....
Be infinitely creative...
Be Outstandingly lucky (HENDRY 1987:29f.)
one immidiately realizes that these three rules have a rather different meaning, depending 
on which field o f scientific practices they are applied. For Field I-reserach, brilliance, 
creativity and luck is needed in order to link social science models to the existing body of 
data, to measurement standards, to theory testing criteria, etc. As a Field III-strategy, 
Hendry's Golden Rules must be seen as an attempt to increase explanatory variation, to 
explore innovative possible world-settings, to focus on unexpected and counter-intuitive 
explanatory factors, etc. It should be added, though, that over the last decades the 
abandonment-strategy for Field I- and the reliance on Field Ill-work has been actually 
pursued by economists. In an analysis o f the articles in the Journal o f  Econometrics from 
1973 to 1990, Hugo A. Kreuzenkamp and Jan R. Magnus could demonstrate that from a
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total o f 668 papers, only 21% conveyed an empirical message that exceeds mere 
illustration (KREUZENKAMP/MAGNUS 1995b: 19). Upon closer insepction however - 
the papers which explicitly attempt to test a theory statistically are rare (less than a 
dozen); the cases where a clear conclusion (acceptance or rejection of the theory) 
emerges, are even rarer. (IBID:290)
APPROXIMATIONS: The rescue operation via the necessary nature of approximations 
is clearly bound to fail since approximations mean, within the context o f two distinct 
modeling cultures, two different things. Within the Field-I, the essential requirement for 
introducing approximations is the empirical measurable and observable distance to those 
processes for which they are assumed to be approximations. In the context o f Field III, 
any assumption may be legitimately qualified as approximation since the actual distances 
do not play any significant role in the model-building operations. It may be argued, 
however, that modeling assumptions with an intuitive appeal to close approximations will 
rank favorably with respect to evaluation criteria like Anschlufifdhigkeit, etc.61 
CONFIDENCE-INTERVALS: This type of escape route solves an extremely important 
problem for the transformation of Field III-models into Field I-models, since via 
measures of this type problems of data errors, specification errors and the like can be 
dealt with. However, this type o f reasoning, like the strategy for abandoning Field I-work 
altogether, is restricted to a particular, albeit central aspect o f the overall problems only. 
DUALISM: The closest links to the dissolution o f the modeling dilemma, offered within 
the present article, can be found between the dualisation strategy and the modal split into 
possible worlds- and actual world approaches. The major difference however, must be 
seen in the fact that dualism is still bound to the reference frame of the traditional 
epistemic culture whereas here a radical separation between at least two types of cultures 
has been put forward. Consequently, the dualist proposals can be regarded as partial 
solution which must be enriched, according to chapters three and four, not only with 
additional rule systems and evaluation criteria, but also with a more comprehensive 
overall framework stressing the successful differentiation and separation into different 
epistemic cultures.
EXTERNALIZATION: Likewise, the extemalization move must be seen as a fore-runner 
o f the presently introduced distinctions of modeling approaches as well as of different 
epistemic cultures. The main deficiency of the extemalisation-strategy lies in the fact that 
this split does not go much beyond the basic distinctions already introduced by Joseph A. 
Schumpeter fifty years ago. Accordingly, extemalization is a necessary pre-requirement
 ^* It must be added immidiately that approximations within the context of the whole article are not to be interpreted as a 
relation between modeling assumptions and the real world, but as a relation between one type of descriptions, i.e. 
modeling assumptions, to other types of descriptions like observations, measurements, etc., i.e. to modeling assumptions 
with a high degree of reliability and credibility.
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for a successful dissolution o f the modeling dilemma, but its status is that o f an opening 
move in a game, not that o f a winning-strategy.
INFANCY: The infancy argument may be qualified as the comparatively weakest escape- 
path since the social sciences have had their great model visions and their corresponding 
classics like „The Wealth o f Nations“ or „Tableau Economique“ already in the period 
between 1758 and 1776 which comes relatively close to Newton's „Principia 
Mathematica“ o f 1687. Thus, the infancy-strategy must be qualified as a variation o f an 
immunization-strategy (H. ALBERT) with zero-content since, despite an already 
extremely prolonged period o f no«-maturtity, it can be, in principle, re-iterated at any 
point in the future ....
INSTRUMENTALISM: The fifth version, namely Freedman's „Don't worry, be happy“- 
strategy, can be seen as a radical mixture between Field I- and Field III-operations, since 
it presumes both the overall context of a Field I-game and the actual rules o f a Field III- 
operation, i.e. the freedom to choose any type o f modeling assumption, etc. Thus, 
Freedman's methodological device can be seen analogous to two players who start their 
game in front o f a chessboard with all the 32 chessmen, who turn, in due course, to a 
game o f checkers by eliminating the unnecessary components and by restricting the 
remaining elements to the diagonal moves o f checkers only, and who, in the end, interpret 
the result o f their game-operations as victories or defeats in a chess-game ... 
MODEL-SELECTION: Due to the separation into two modeling approaches, the 
seemingly uniform criterion o f model-selection is immediately split into two subsets of 
problems. First, within Field I, model-selection implies a search according to a set o f 
criteria similar to the left hand side o f Table 7. Second, model-selectionP must be centered 
around the evaluation criteria o f possible world approaches where heavy emphasis should 
and must be devoted to heuristic criteria like reduction of complexity, paradox detection 
or the degree o f formalizability, etc. Moreover, a switch from criteria o f model-testing to 
criteria o f model selection should, in all probability, simply lead to a problem-transfer 
from one level to a higher one since all the interesting and puzzling problems with respect 
to choosing a well-tested model will re-appear at the level o f model-selection criteria 
again.
NONEXPERIMENT AL MODELING-TECHNIQUES: Viewed within the new 
framework o f different epistemic cultures, model-selection becomes a typical device for 
Field I-work since in Field III the data used may exhibit all sorts o f qualities, but, in 
general, they will be experimental, artificial in nature. Consequently, switching to 
nonexperimental data designs will and can be of tremendous use - but only as a Field I- 
device for employing models which, by their very design, come closer to the data 
generation processes.
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SEGMENTATION: The segmentation-strategy can be considered, in principle, as a 
useful reserach task for Field I-approaches as well as for Field III-frameworks simply 
because it highlights comparative strengths and weaknesses in the application o f various 
research programs. However, taking Rational Choice (RC) as paradigmatic example, the 
main deficiency o f the segmentation strategy lies in the fact that it remains largely unclear 
where the areas o f intended applications should be located:
For Aldrich (1993), the stakes, involved in rational decision making, must be 
substantial and the individual must have, moreover, a significant impact on the 
final outcome of actions.
For Elster (1986), RC-accounts should be used in decision cases with a fixed 
number o f alternatives, where no interference with the decisions o f other actors can 
be assumed.
For Ferejohn (1991, 1993), RC-frameworks should be implemented in the case of 
severely constrained actions and interactions.
For Maoz (1990), it is the absence o f extremely low and extremely high levels of 
stress, since low stress can imply both low motivational drives and low practical 
constraints, whereas in high-stress circumstances the motivational drive is 
extremely strong, and time pressure is acute (MAOZ 1990:318ff.)
For Schumpeter (1975), closeness to the economic realm should qualify as the 
criterion upon which the utilization of RC-models should be based.
If high stake-actions, severly constrained, with fixed  numbers o f alternatives, well 
between critical threshold-values of too low or too high stress and, finally, close enough 
to market interactions, are to be understood as the paradigmatic RC-applications, which 
socio-economic configurations and ensembles, if  any, can legitimately qualify as 
explanatory RC-candidates? Especially in the case o f segmentation strategies, it seems 
worthwhile to differentiate, at the outset, whether the realm of segmented applications is 
to be located within Field I or Field III.
STRUCTURALISM: It would be too long for this article to highlight the consequences, if 
any, o f the pragmatic separation into distinct fields and into different types of modeling 
cultures for structuralist reconstructions. But it might be wothwhile to add, at this point, 
that the pragmatic differentiations with respect to the realms of intended applications*.,» or 
with respect to evaluation criteria*.,, both for the theoretical and the non-theoretical model- 
components could offer an additional set of conditions which could be added in order to 
be able to account, in a more satisficing manner, for the evolution* o f scientific 
disciplines, especially the social sciences.
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WEAKENING: Finally, the split between i/j/c^-rational accounts and their thin 
counterparts may be qualified as a typical division for the two types o f modeling fields.
Thin analyses happen, under normal circumstances, within the third field, whereas thick 
forms o f investigations are ordinarily confined to the firs t  field. It should be added 
however, that an argument could be made to use very thin modeling components like the 
consisteny o f weak preference ordering also as a testable assumption for Field I- 
operations, too.
In sum, the distinction, introduced here on at least two different epistemic cultures within the social 
sciences and, consequently, on two separate modeling approaches corresponding to these two cultures, 
should provide a suitable understanding why the modeling dilemma and, consequently, the escape- 
strategies have arisen at all. The modeling dilemma as well as the attempts for its dissolution can be 
seen as fu tile  endeavors to reconcile exploratory modeling? operations which, in view of a highly 
complex environment become absolutely essential, with the practices, premises, and principles o f a 
traditional epistemic culture. These attempts for adaptation have been and still are bound, by 
necessity, to fail. It has been demonstrated that within the conetxt o f an emerging alternative epistemic 
culture, the normal practices and operations with respect to model-building can be interpreted in a 
comparatively straightforward and almost natural manner. Moreover, the escape-strategies for the 
modeling dilemma enlisted in the second chapter can be seen, in one way or the other, as focussing on 
one side o f the two modeling fields in the social sciences only.
7. Concluding Outlooks
Seven years ago, two nobel prize winners in economics, Lawrence Klein and Maurice Allais, delivered, 
independently from each other, lectures on the future course o f economics at the Institute for Advanced 
Studies. At first sight, the upshots o f their lectures seemed utterly contradictory: Klein advocated more 
interdisciplinary cooperation between economists, psychologists, sociologists, historians and the like, 
more powerful computers, more data ... Allais, on the other hand, favored more powerful models with 
few, but highly significant components, more axiomatizations, more thinking ... The present article 
offers, among many other features, a convenient way to reconcile both perspectives by attributing 
Klein's vision as a rational widening strategy for scientific endeavors within Field I, whereas Allais' 
plea for deepening should be considered as a highly relevant agenda for Field III-operations.
In the end, both roads to the socio-economic universes around us, be they on the micro- or on the 
macro-scale, am  in almost desparate need for rapid reconfigurations, adaptations, and modernizations.
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